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JUSTICE BRENNAN'S SUPPORTING ROLE
HONORABLE RAYMOND C. FISHER*
First of all, this conference is quite timely, even though it is
30 years after Terry.' In my more recent incarnation, before I
became a member of the Justice Department, I was serving as
President of the Los Angeles Police Commission, which has jurisdiction over the Los Angeles Police Department. I was being
briefed as a Commissioner by the head of the anti-terrorist division, which, as its name implies, engages in domestic surveillance of alleged terrorist groups. It has been a very controversial
division in Los Angeles. It had been accused of spying against
political figures and the like, and its ability to engage in undercover operations and the like had been litigated and constrained
by a consent decree. The consent decree had expired and we, as
Commissioners, were being asked to liberalize the conditions
under which the LAPD could send in undercover officers or engage in wire taps or the like. Not having done any criminal law
since I left the Court, I was wondering, what are the restraints
in criminal procedure these days on engaging in this kind of activity? I was told by the City Attorney, "Oh, don't worry. You
can do this under reasonable suspicion. That's Terry v. Ohio."2
That was a bit of a flashback. As Earl said, I didn't remember
"reasonable suspicion" as the standard that came out of that
case, but I had not looked at it recently.3 My actual reaction,
though, was surprise: "Is Terry v. Ohio still the law?!"
Interestingly enough, there's another side of the equation
that's still being litigated quite aggressively in Los Angeles and
relates to the issues we're talking about today. There is a con-

* Associate Attorney General of the United States. A.B., University of California
at Santa Barbara, 1961; LL.B., Stanford University, 1966; Law Clerk to Associate
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 1967-68.
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2 In fact, the precise holding of Terry was somewhat more narrow than the City
Attorney urged. See id. at 30.
3See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, The Warren Court, and the Fourth
Amendment: A Law Clerk's Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 891 (1998).
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troversial special investigative unit in Los Angeles, which consists of a highly trained group of officers who are charged with
the surveillance and arrest of allegedly heavily armed bank robbers and criminals. There's a civil rights lawsuit pending in federal court where there is a serious issue of whether the squad is
violating the civil rights of the bad guys by waiting for the crime
to happen before the squad intervenes. Often, the crime happens and as the bad guys leave the scene, usually a bank or a
business establishment, the squad then engages in fairly aggressive arrest techniques. The argument that is being made by
the plaintiffs is that the police officers should be able to intervene much earlier in the process. That is, they ought to be able
to, either under a doctrine of probable cause or even reasonable
suspicion, intervene and stop these events before they happen.
The police officers are arguing that if they do so, they will not get
convictions, and the cases will be tossed for lack of probable
cause. So, it is a very live and heavily debated issue. I find it
somewhat ironic that 30 years after I had a modest role in the
Terry v. Ohio discussion of probable cause and reasonable suspicion, when I was only one-and-a-half years out of law school with
absolutely no knowledge of what really went on in the streets, I
was confronting these same issues 30 years later with a lot of
real-world experience to inform my judgments. And that leads
me to talk a little bit about process.
What you've heard today, and certainly what I've heard today, from the lawyers who actually tried the facts of the case and
saw the participants, is a much fuller discussion of what happened in Terry v. Ohio, in the actual event and in the litigation
of the case. By the time a case gets to the Supreme Court and
falls into the hands of the Justices and the law clerks, it gets
very abstracted; not away from the facts entirely, because as
you'll see from the opinion, there's a very careful recitation of the
facts.4 But at least in the cases I had the opportunity to work on,
you wind up dealing with a record that is a cold record. You're
reading the transcript and you do not get the nuances. You
never see the people, the real people involved, and you only get a
sense of what the facts were generally about. And as a law clerk,
it often bothered me that we were trying to deal with making
law based on what was a very abstract record.

4 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 4-7.
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Now that is the nature of the appellate process, understandably, but when one practices and goes out and tries cases,
one realizes how much the facts matter and as Judge Juviler was
saying, how much juries can be influenced by what the nuances
are and by what goes on in the real world. So there is that disconnect.5 As Earl was saying, the Justices in Terry v. Ohio were
attempting to deal with major, major principles of law, namely,
the evolution of search and seizure and the exclusionary rule,
based on a record that was presented to them through argument,
through the transcripts, and the like, but which was fairly abstracted.6 And the Justices were, as they did throughout the
Term in a number of different kinds of cases, trying to articulate
principles based on what they believed the real world was all
about. That is a very human process and can frequently be
flawed. Not necessarily in a bad way, but certainly as to certain
aspects of decisions which those of us who later have to go out
and practice under, these standards may cause us to wonder,
what the heck were they thinking about? Where are they getting
their information?
The law clerks in the Supreme Court play an important role.
The law clerks in chambers follow different procedures according
to their Justices. Justices have their own way of doing things,
but the law clerks, nonetheless, are the ones who contribute a
tremendous amount of research and do a lot of drafting of preliminary opinions. The Justices then, of course, do what they
individually care to do in terms of turning out their own product.
In regard to Terry, the notes of the conference that John just
read are not notes I was aware of. I do not know if Earl was
aware of all those debates. I certainly was not. Both of us had a
role in putting some words down on paper to carry out the general directions of what we were told by our respective Justices,
but basically we were writing as research assistants, and again,
working with the materials that were given to us, which were
not as complete or as nuanced as we're hearing this morning. I
say that because one parses opinions and looks for meaning in
the words and in the phrases, and in the debate between concurring, dissenting, and majority opinions, to find some window
into the dynamics of what goes on within the Court.
" See Honorable Michael R. Juviler, A Prosecutor'sPerspective, 72 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 741 (1998).
6 See Dudley, supra note 3.
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When I was there, Justice Brennan was in his heyday. Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren were the closest of
friends and the closest of colleagues. Justice Brennan played a
very powerful role on the Court. He was someone who was extremely collegial, both in his personal dealings and in his professional dealings. He made it a point simply to embrace all
members of the Court, and he, as part of his development of the
jurisprudence of the Warren Court era, played an enormous role
which has been recognized many times over in many forums, and
I will not belabor the point. But this case, Terry v. Ohio, was a
classic example of how Justice Brennan worked. As Earl said,
there was a draft opinion circulated by the Chief Justice. Justice
Harlan had weighed in with a different viewpoint, a different
approach, and I was not much paying attention to it. It was not
my job as a law clerk to pay much attention to opinions I was not
working on, so I have a very, very sketchy knowledge of what
was going on during the time when, as Earl indicates, the draft
opinions were sitting out there. All I remember is that one day
Justice Brennan popped into our chambers and said, "Here's an
approach that I think we can try that may move this along." He
had talked to the Chief Justice, apparently. I do not know who
else he had talked to, whether he had talked to Justice Douglas,
whether he talked to Justice Harlan, or to any of the other swing
votes or swing opinions within the Court, but in any event, what
he asked for was a draft of an approach which he then forwarded
on to the Chief Justice. And that is typically how Justice Brennan would work. He would be very concerned about how doctrine was being developed by the Court through the various
opinions, and even if he was not the author of the opinion, he
was quite willing to work with other Justices who did have the
opinion writing assignment. He would work with those Justices
in terms of providing drafts of memos or whatever could help
those Justices break through any log jams.
Justice Brennan was quite adroit at going around and personalizing his approach with the other Justices to find out what
was bothering them, and to try to arrive at some principled consensus. An example that I can cite that he, himself, has made
public was in the school desegregation cases, the freedom of
choice cases that also came up in that Term. Justice Brennan
was determined that those opinions, which were the impiemen-
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tation of Brown v. Board of Education,7 had to be unanimous.
This was the follow-up to the implementation of Brown, making
sure that de jure segregation in the schools, particularly in the
South, was removed.' But it was not going fast enough, and
freedom of choice was viewed as a way of simply delaying and
deferring the process. Justice Brennan felt it was important politically, and for all the reasons that Earl has pointed out in
terms of the context that was existing in 1967, that those opinions be unanimous. So he worked with every member of that
Court to deal with reservations individual Justices had to the
opinions he was circulating in draft, and at the end of the day
those opinions were unanimous.9 But they were only unanimous
because Justice Brennan worked the chambers of the Supreme
Court to arrive at a principled decision, one that accommodated
the conflicting views of different Justices, including some of his
strongest allies like Justice Douglas and Justice Black.
So, it is an interesting process how the Supreme Court goes
about its business. Whole political science courses are taught
about it. Some of them are right on and some of them are a little
off the mark, because until you've been there, it is hard to understand all of it. I do not mean to be patronizing about that. I have
no idea, to be honest, how the Justices and their clerks work in
the current Court, but in 1967 it was a Court that was, even
with its philosophical divisions, a very collegial Court. There
was a great effort to arrive at principled decisions in an era
when it was clear that the Supreme Court was making profound
changes in the criminal law context. The whole incorporation of
the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment was in
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (hereinafter Brown 1).
8 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955) (promulgating factors that lower courts should consider in implementing Brown ); see also Goss v.
Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 689 (1963) (holding that a Tennessee free transfer
public school desegregation plan was insufficient under Brown 1); Bush v. Orleans
Parish Sch. Bd., 364 U.S. 500, 501 (1960) (per curiam) (refusing to stay an injunction compelling the state to comply with the Court's desegregation decisions); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (asserting that the Court's school desegregation
decisions were binding on the state government of Arkansas).
9 See Green v. County Sch. Bd. 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968) (holding that a Virginia desegregation plan was insufficient under Brown I and the Court's other
school desegregation decisions); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 458-59
(1968) (holding that a Tennessee desegregation plan which essentially allowed two
junior high schools to remain segregated did not meet the Court's standards as set
forth in Brown 1).
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full swing."0 It was a very exciting time to be there. It is, I
think, a testament to the way those opinions were put together
that 30 years later, as my City Attorney in Los Angeles told me,
Terry v. Ohio is still the law.
Thank you for letting me share this time.

'0 See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 593-94 (1969) (holding that a defendant's conviction under a New York statute for desecrating an American flag in
public could not be permitted to stand under the Fourteenth Amendment); Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63-66 (1968) (applying the Terry standard to a New York
"stop and frisk" law); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1967) (holding that a
warrantless search of an impounded vehicle was reasonable under the circumstances, where the vehicle was used as "evidence in a forfeiture proceeding").

